Feminist Aesthetics and Copyright Law: Genius, Value, and Gendered Visions of the Creative Self by Craig, Carys J.
Osgoode Hall Law School of York University
Osgoode Digital Commons
Osgoode Legal Studies Research Paper Series Research Papers, Working Papers, ConferencePapers
2014
Feminist Aesthetics and Copyright Law: Genius,
Value, and Gendered Visions of the Creative Self
Carys J. Craig
Osgoode Hall Law School of York University, ccraig@osgoode.yorku.ca
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/olsrps
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Research Papers, Working Papers, Conference Papers at Osgoode Digital Commons. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Osgoode Legal Studies Research Paper Series by an authorized administrator of Osgoode Digital Commons.
Recommended Citation
Craig, Carys J., "Feminist Aesthetics and Copyright Law: Genius, Value, and Gendered Visions of the Creative Self " (2014). Osgoode
Legal Studies Research Paper Series. 31.
http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/olsrps/31
OSGOODE HALL LAW SCHOOL 
LEGAL STUDIES RESEARCH PAPER SERIES 
Research Paper No. 42 
Vol. 10/ Issue. 10/ (2014) 
Feminist Aesthetics and Copyright Law: 
Genius, Value, and Gendered Visions of the 
Creative Self 
Craig, C. (2014). Feminist Aesthetics and Copyright Law: Genius, Value, and 
Gendered Visions of the Creative Self. In I. Calboli & S. Ragavan (eds.), 
Protecting and Promoting Diversity with Intellectual Property Law. United 
Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming.
Carys J. Craig 
Editors: 
Editor-in-Chief: Carys J. Craig (Associate Dean of Research & Institutional Relations and 
Associate Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto) 
Production Editor: James Singh (Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto) 
This paper can be downloaded free of charge from: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2464536 
Further Information and a collection of publications about Osgoode Hall Law School Legal 
Studies Research Paper Series can be found at: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/JELJOUR_Results.cfm?form_name=journalbrowse&journal_id=722488 
Osgoode Legal Studies Research Paper No. 42 
Vol. 10/ Issue. 10/ (2014) 
Feminist Aesthetics and Copyright Law: 
Genius, Value, and Gendered Visions of the Creative Self 
Craig, C. (2014). Feminist Aesthetics and Copyright Law: Genius, Value, and Gendered Visions 
of the Creative Self. In I. Calboli & S. Ragavan (eds.), Protecting and Promoting Diversity with 
Intellectual Property Law. United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming. 
Carys J. Craig 
Abstract:  
Copyright law is fundamentally concerned with the value of cultural works—both the 
recognition and the creation of this value. Yet it is seldom acknowledged that copyright law 
makes or requires any value judgment in the sense of an aesthetic evaluation of copyright’s 
subject matter. Indeed, it is often emphasized that copyright protects original works of 
authorship regardless of their quality or merit. That copyright protection demands the 
satisfaction of only the most minimal of qualitative standards does not, however, dispose of 
the larger claim that forms the basis of this chapter: our copyright system is dominated by a 
particular aesthetic theory or idea. Any attempt to justify the rights established by the 
copyright system over artistic works must presuppose an aesthetic theory of sorts in order 
to explain what is protected and why (as well as what is not protected or permitted, and 
why not). While not based on the quality of copyright’s subject matter, these explanatory 
efforts will point to its nature as original literary or artistic expression, which thus deserves 
or requires some form of legally recognized reward. We simply cannot justify the copyright 
system without ascribing some value to the particular expressive works in which it vests, 
and the creative acts and actors that it privileges. Seen in this light, it can hardly be claimed 
that copyright law is aesthetically agnostic. In this chapter, my goal is to uncover, in 
copyright’s most basic patterns, the hidden aesthetics of copyright law as viewed from a 
critical feminist perspective. My suggestion is that conceptions of aesthetic value and its 
production are stitched into the very fabric of copyright law, defining its contours and 
determining the purposes it serves—and what is more, these conceptions of aesthetic value 
are fundamentally gendered. 
Keywords: 
Copyright, aesthetics, originality, authorship, genius, gender, feminism 
Author(s): 
Carys J. Craig 
Associate Professor 
Osgoode Hall Law School 
York University, Toronto 
E: ccraig@osgoode.yorku.ca 
1 
Feminist Aesthetics and Copyright Law:  
Genius, Value, and Gendered Visions of the Creative Self 
Carys J. Craig* 
I. Introduction 
Copyright law protects works of literature, art, music, and drama. As such, it is 
fundamentally concerned with the value of cultural works—both the recognition and the 
creation of this value. Yet it is seldom acknowledged that copyright law makes or requires any 
“value judgment” in the sense of an aesthetic evaluation of copyright’s subject matter. Indeed, it 
is often emphasized that copyright protects original works of authorship regardless of their 
quality or merit; after all, anything from blank accounting forms to corporate logos may qualify 
as protected “works” for copyright purposes. That copyright protection demands the satisfaction 
of only the most minimal of qualitative standards does not, however, dispose of the larger claim 
that forms the basis of this chapter: our copyright system is dominated by a particular aesthetic 
theory or idea. Any attempt to justify the rights established by the copyright system over artistic 
works must presuppose an aesthetic theory of sorts in order to explain what is protected and 
why (as well as what is not protected or permitted, and why not). While not based on the quality 
of copyright’s subject matter, these explanatory efforts will point to its nature as original 
literary or artistic expression, which thus deserves or requires some form of legally recognized 
reward. We simply cannot justify copyright without ascribing some value and significance to 
the particular expressive works in which it vests, and the creative acts and actors that it 
privileges. Seen in this light, it could seem almost audacious to claim that copyright law is 
aesthetically agnostic. 
This book pulls at the many loose threads of our intellectual property system to reveal, 
amidst the tangle of legal doctrine and complex concepts, the gaps where diverse interests and 
perspectives are, much like dropped stitches in a blanket, omissions that threaten to ruin the 
effectiveness and attractiveness of the whole project. In this chapter, my goal is to uncover, in 
copyright’s most basic patterns, the hidden aesthetics of copyright law as viewed from a critical 
feminist perspective. My suggestion is that conceptions of aesthetic value and its production are 
stitched into the very fabric of copyright law, defining its contours and determining the 
purposes it serves—and what is more, these conceptions of aesthetic value are fundamentally 
gendered. 
The chapter proceeds, in Part II, to draw the connections between copyright law and 
aesthetics in general, and then advances the claim that a particular aesthetic theory—that of 
romantic aestheticism—dominates our copyright system. Part III describes the author-figure 
that occupies center-stage in copyright discourse and employs feminist critiques of the concepts 
*
 Associate Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto. 
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of “originality” and “genius” to suggest that copyright’s protagonist, the romantic author, is not 
gender-neutral but rather fundamentally patriarchal. Throughout, this discussion implies 
copyright’s complicity in the exclusion and marginalization of women and female creativity in 
the literary and artistic domain. In Part IV, I survey some of the ways in which feminist 
aesthetics might disrupt copyright’s most central assumptions. Rather than offer a 
comprehensive account of any particular line of critique and its full doctrinal implications, my 
aim here is to convey the critical potential of harnessing feminist aesthetic theories and bringing 
them to bear on copyright law. Not only could this effort enhance the diversity of perspectives 
represented in the current debates over copyright’s future; it could produce a diversification of 
the interests, values and voices that copyright protects.     
 
 
II. Copyright and Aesthetic Judgment 
 
A. Defining Copyright’s Subject Matter  
 
Copyright protects only original works of an artistic, literary, dramatic, or musical 
nature. By requiring such classification, the law would seem to demand at least some basic 
explanation of what is meant by “art,” what sounds constitute “music,” what symbols, when 
strung together might be said to amount to “literary” expression. And yet, copyright 
jurisprudence is replete with the insistence that no such assessment of the substance of a work is 
required—the determination of whether something is an “artistic work,” we are frequently 
assured, has nothing to do with the qualitative evaluation of whether something is good art, bad 
art, or even a “work of art.”1 As Alfred Yen put it, “the general irrelevance of aesthetics has 
become a cornerstone of copyright jurisprudence.”2 In Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing 
Co., for example, Justice Holmes famously warned, “[I]t would be a dangerous undertaking for 
persons trained only to the law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial 
illustrations, outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits.”3 In the House of Lords 
judgment in George Hensher v Restawhile, Justice Reid wrote of “a trend of authority with 
which I agree that a court ought not to be called on to make an aesthetic judgment. Judges have 
to be experts in the use of the English language but they are not experts in art or aesthetics.”4 In 
DRG Inc. v Datafile Ltd., Justice Reed warned that “[r]equiring Courts to determine what is 
‘artistic’ . . . is not a happy situation,”5 and concluded that the phrase “artistic work” is used in 
copyright legislation merely “as a general description of works which find expression in a visual 
medium.”6 Yet, if the institution of copyright law is indeed aimed at the “progress of the arts”7 
                                                          
1
 See, e.g. George Hensher Ltd. v Restawhile Upholstery Ltd. [1976] A.C. 64 (H.L.) 78-9 (U.K.) (Lord Reid stating 
that “it may be misleading to equate artistic craftsmanship with a work of art. ‘Work of art’ is generally associated 
more with the fine arts than with craftsmanship and may be setting too high a standard.”). 
2
 Alfred C. Yen, Copyright Opinions and Aesthetic Theory, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 247, 249 (1998).  
3
 Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co. 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903). 
4
 Hensher, [1976] A.C. at 78. 
5
 DRG Inc. v Datafile Ltd., [1988] 2 C.F. 243, para. 12 (Can.). 
6
 Id. at para. 15. 
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and the encouragement of “works of the arts and intellect,”8 this refusal to give substantive legal 
definition to “art” might seem strange or troublesome: can we really make, apply, and justify 
laws that encourage the creation of something we refuse to define?    
 
Alfred Yen has argued convincingly that the judicial insistence upon avoiding explicit 
aesthetic judgments in copyright cases maintains a perceived distinction between aesthetic and 
legal reasoning that is entirely illusory; it rests on a particular understanding of the nature of 
legal reasoning as a rule-bound exercise in formal logic.
9
 A Canadian judge expressly trying to 
avoid judging the artistic merit of an architectural work nicely captured the connection:  
 
It is gratifying to think that those who drafted this Act were content to leave such 
aesthetic responsibility to the judiciary, but it is, I think, dangerous to assume 
such intention. . . . The good art of today is almost invariably the bad Art of 
tomorrow, for aesthetic standards and values change from generation to 
generation. . . . The legal approach is, as a rule, to elevate precedent and to view 
innovations somewhat askance. The function of the Judge has always been to 
weigh evidence and propound existing law. In the arts, evidence of aesthetic 
values is, as a rule, merely the heated opinion of prejudiced adherents.
10
  
 
Implicit in this passage is the mistaken assumption identified by Yen: “[a]esthetic reasoning is 
subjective and indeterminate, while legal reasoning is objective and rigorous.” To the contrary, 
Yen argues, “judges necessarily show a preference for certain aesthetic perspectives when they 
decide cases because copyright law simply requires aesthetic choices.”11 Consider the need, 
when establishing copyright protection, to distinguish between artistic works and mere tools or 
“useful articles;” between “works of artistic craftsmanship” and basic craftwork; and between 
“sculptures” and any other three-dimensional product. Courts have denied making aesthetic 
judgments when determining, for example, that furniture prototypes, while pleasing to the eye, 
are not works of artistic craftsmanship
12
; that colored rods for teaching mathematics, while 
“attractive,” are not artistic works13; that color-coded filing labels, while functionally useful, are 
nonetheless artistic works
14
; that costume helmets, although not actually useful, are not 
sculptures
15
; that jewelry designs, while primarily for “visual effect,” might be more 
appropriately protected as “industrial designs”;16 et cetera.  
                                                                                                                                                                                         
7
 U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.  
8
 Théberge v. Galerie d'Art du Petit Champlain Inc., 2002 SCC 34, at para. 30 (Can.).  
9
 Yen, supra note 2, at 249. 
10
 Hay & Hay Constr. v. Sloan, [1957] 27 C.P.R. 132, at para. 5 (Can.). 
11
 Yen, supra note 2, at 250. 
12
 George Hensher Ltd. v Restawhile Upholstery Ltd. [1976] A.C. 64 (H.L.) (U.K.) 
13
 Cuisenaire v. South West Imps. Ltd. [1969] S.C.R. 208 (Can.). 
14
 DRG Inc. v Datafile Ltd., [1988] 2 C.F. 243 (Can.)., 
15
 Lucasfilm Ltd. v. Ainsworth, [2011] UKSC 39. 
16
 Pyrrha Design Inc. v 623735 Saskatchewan Ltd., 2004 FCA 423 (Can.). 
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Such determinations are not simply the mechanical application of legal rules or 
established precedent, but require the privileging of one interpretation over a competing 
alternative interpretation, one precedent over another. In efforts to avoid appearing to judge 
artistic merit, Yen argues, courts are actually choosing between different aesthetic theories on a 
case by case basis: they might ask whether contemplating the work produces an aesthetic 
response in people
17
 (aesthetic formalism); whether a work’s creator intended the work to 
satisfy an aesthetic interest
18
 (intentionalism); or whether a work has been recognized in the art-
world as art
19
 (institutionalism). Simply put, the selection between different approaches to 
identifying artistic works is, in itself, the expression of an aesthetic preference.
20
      
 
My point is not to decry the presence of aesthetic judgment in legal or judicial decision-
making. The significance of recognizing the aesthetic judgments in copyright decision-making 
is to acknowledge the inevitability of aesthetic bias in copyright jurisprudence. For Yen, since 
“no aesthetic perspective can be neutral and all-encompassing”,21 the goal is to increase 
awareness, to manage aesthetic subjectivity, to constrain bias, and to encourage open-
mindedness. Moreover, by acknowledging that “aesthetically subjective decision making is the 
only possible approach in copyright cases,”22 we can appreciate the importance of  identifying 
and  critically evaluating the dominant, purportedly neutral aesthetic bias that has so 
fundamentally shaped the copyright system. If it is impossible for legal reasoning to separate 
copyright from aesthetics, the question is “not whether aesthetics should affect copyright law, 
but how.”23 
 
This is a crucial question to ask when considering the capacity of copyright law to either 
enhance or limit cultural diversity. Building on Yen’s observations, John Tehranian explains 
that copyright’s aesthetic adjudications: 
 
                                                          
17
 See, e.g. Hensher, [1976] A.C. at 78 (Lord Reid stating “If any substantial section of the public genuinely 
admires and values a thing for its appearance and gets pleasure or satisfaction, whether emotional or intellectual, 
from looking at it, I would accept that it is artistic although many others may think it meaningless or common or 
vulgar.”). 
18
 See, e.g., Cuisennaire v. South West Imps. Ltd. [1968] 1 Ex. C.R. 493 at para. 73 (Noel J. stating, “An artistic 
work, in my view, must to some degree at least, be a work that is intended to have an appeal to the aesthetic 
senses…as an important or one of the important objects for which the work is brought into being.” See also Hay & 
Hay Constr. v. Sloan, [1957] 27 C.P.R. 132, at para. 5 (per Stewart J.: “the tribunal should not attempt to exercise a 
personal aesthetic judgment but to consider the intent of the creator and its result.”) 
19
 See, e.g. Hensher, [1976] A.C. at 94, per Lord Simon of Glaisdale: “the most cogent evidence [of whether the 
subject matter is a work of artistic craftsmanship] is likely to be from those who are themselves acknowledged 
artist-craftsmen, or from those who are concerned with the training of artist-craftsmen . . . ”. 
20
 This degree of choice implies the kind of inherent subjectivity or discretion in judicial decision making that is 
denied or decried by legal formalists—and has been revealed and trumpeted by critical legal scholars. See John 
Tehranian, Towards a Critical IP Theory: Copyright, Consecration and Control, 2012 BYU L. REV. 1237.   
21
 Yen, supra note 2, at 251. 
22
 Id. at 301. 
23
 Id. at 251, fn 14. 
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inextricably affect the type of works we, as a society, receive from our artists. . . . 
Even more fundamentally, however, aesthetic judgments can serve to both 
maintain and preserve existing power structures. The seemingly neutral laws of 
copyright, therefore, have the potential to create a hierarchy of culture that serves 
hegemonic interests.
24
  
 
Copyright law does not protect everything. In choosing what to protect, it favors certain 
forms of artistic and intellectual expression while it restricts or prohibits others. If these 
choices—these selective protections and prohibitions—are influenced by an underlying but 
largely invisible aesthetic bias, then a critical legal perspective demands that we ask who it 
benefits and who it disproportionately burdens, and what role it plays in consolidating existing 
inequalities. More particularly, from a feminist critical perspective, we might ask, does this 
aesthetic bias have masculinist underpinnings? Amy Newmann warns that “at least historically, 
aestheticist thinking has been a vehicle for blatantly masculinist ideologies privileging a certain 
kind of aesthetic experience . . . arising within male corporeality.”25 If this is so, we might 
reasonably suspect that copyright’s hidden aesthetics maintain and perpetuate a gendered vision 
of authorship, creativity, and aesthetic worth.      
 
 
B. Defining Copyright’s Threshold: The Aesthetics of Originality  
 
Copyright emerged in its modern form in the eighteenth century, conferring on the 
author for the first time a proprietary interest in his text.
26
 It is not by coincidence that this same 
period saw a fundamental shift in conceptions of authorship in general.  In her fascinating book 
on the evolving conception of plagiarism, Marilyn Randall explains that, while prior to the 
eighteenth century, imitation had been the aesthetic norm, the eighteenth century saw a “shift 
from a poetics of imitation to a valorization of originality.”27 Aspirations towards imagination, 
novelty, creativity, and originality took on great significance in the aesthetics of the Romantic 
period, which emphasized the individual author and the author-ity that flows from the sincere 
expression of personal genius.
28
 Romantic aestheticism elevated the artist as individualist: art 
was “to be created and evaluated in isolation from ethical, social or political considerations—as 
a pure expression of human nature that bursts forth independently and individualistically.”29 In 
this view, true authorship captures the essence of human individuality.  
 
                                                          
24
 Tehranian, supra note 20, at 1280. 
25
 Amy Newmann, Aestheticism, Feminism, and the Dynamics of Reversal in AESTHETICS IN FEMINIST 
PERSPECTIVE 193, 194 (Hilde Hein & Carolyn Korsmeyer eds., 1993). 
26
 See Mark Rose, The Author as Proprietor: Donaldson v Becket and the Genealogy of Modern Authorship, 23 
REPRESENTATIONS 51, 54-58 (1988). 
27
 MARILYN RANDALL, PRAGMATIC PLAGIARISM: AUTHORSHIP, PROFIT AND POWER 47 (2003).    
28
 Id. at 51.  
29
 Newman, supra note 25, at 194. 
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The well-known words of Justice Homes in Bleistein v Donaldson Lithographing Co. 
give context to this understanding in the copyright realm: “The [original work] is the personal 
reaction of an individual upon nature. Personality always contains something unique. It 
expresses its singularity even in handwriting, and a very modest grade of art has in it something 
irreducible, which is one man’s alone.”30 The distinction between imitation and originality is 
thus intricately tied to the perception of man’s fundamental nature; the man who copies from 
another sacrifices his authenticity and obscures his intrinsic worth. The valorization of the 
individual author and his originality, and the resulting denigration of imitation or copying, is 
axiomatic in modern copyright law. Copyright law, which protects and encourages the creation 
of “original works,” prohibits and discourages copying and the production of unauthorized 
derivative works.  
 
From its inception with the passing of the Statute of Anne in 1710, modern copyright has 
vested in authors. An “author” for copyright purposes is no more and no less than the person 
who originates the expression that copyright protects. If an author is defined by his creation of 
protectable expression, then the substance of “authorship” is determined by the legal threshold 
requirement of “originality.” The originality standard has been a controversial one across time 
and place. In the Continental European jurisprudence, it invokes the need for a work to be a 
“personal intellectual creation”; in the United States, it requires a minimal amount of 
“creativity”; in the United Kingdom, it demands “skill and labour”; in Canada, it involves 
something in between creativity and labour, namely, a more than trivial amount of “skill and 
judgment.”31 Even at its most elevated, the standard thus requires no more than the exercise of 
some minimum of creative choice, with the result that virtually any work that is not simply 
copied and involves some degree of choice between different possible options is likely to 
qualify. Qualitatively, then, the originality determination typically involves little in the way of 
aesthetic evaluation. But it does not follow that it is devoid of aesthetic assumptions.  
 
Importantly, the very premise of originality under any of these interpretative schools is 
the origination of a work in the mind of the individual; the expression emanates from him and 
his intellectual efforts (however unimpressive it may be). It is, then, not because of the quality 
of their substance but just the sheer fact of their individual origination that original works are 
thought to merit protection. The work is protected as the “original product of the intellection of 
a unique individual (or identifiable individuals).”32 The author who merits protection is “the 
person who conceives, who expresses ideas, who composes, who creates the work as a result of 
his labour, his qualities and his personal efforts.”33  
                                                          
30
 Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co. 188 U.S. 239, 249 (1903). 
31
 See Elizabeth F. Judge & Daniel Gervais, Of Silos and Constellations: Comparing Notions of Originality in 
Copyright Law, 27 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 375 (2009). 
32
 Martha Woodmansee, On the Author Effect: Recovering Collectivity, 10 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 279, 291-92 
(1992) [hereinafter Woodmansee, On the Author]. 
33
 Ateliers Tango Argentin Inc. v. Festival d’Espagne et d’Amerique Latine Inc. (1997), 84 C.P.R. 3d 56, per Crete 
J. (trans.); see also Borrow-Giles Lithographic Company v Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 57-58 (1884) (defining “author” 
as “he to whom anything owed its origin; originator; maker; one who completes a work of science or literature.”). 
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This conclusion speaks to the essential individuality and mental isolation of the worthy 
“author” as conceived by copyright law. As Jessica Litman explained, “Our copyright law is 
based on the charming notion that authors create something from nothing, that works owe their 
origin to the authors who produce them.”34 Authorship is constructed in law as an individual 
moment of creation, where words or notes or actions are born of a largely internal, independent 
process, making them uniquely the author’s. A defining feature of copyright’s underlying 
aesthetic philosophy is, therefore, the objective appreciation of originality, authenticity, and the 
individuality of the human mind. 
 
A large body of copyright scholarship over the past twenty-five years has sought to 
demonstrate the presence of a Romantic conception of authorship in the fundamental concepts, 
principles, and adjudication of copyright law.
35
 Martha Woodmansee, for example, has argued 
that our intellectual property laws are rooted in the “reconceptualization of the creative process 
which culminated in high Romantic pronouncements . . . to the effect that this process ought to 
be solitary, or individual, and introduce ‘a new element into the intellectual universe.’”36 What 
is more, she suggests, these laws are themselves “one of the most powerful vehicles of the 
modern authorship construct.”37 James Boyle has warned that the myth of the Romantic author 
causes us to value some forms of creation over others, and to underestimate the importance of 
external sources in the creative process.
38
 Mark Rose has decried “the persistence of the 
discourse of original genius . . . and the reifications of author and work” in copyright law.39 For 
Rose, what emerged out of the nineteenth century and continues to cause difficulties for 
copyright law todayis “the [romantic] notion of the author as a creative man who by virtue of 
imposing the imprint of his unique personality on his original works makes them his own.”40 
The distinction between creative (‘productive’) and pseudo-creative (‘reproductive’) 
                                                          
34
 Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965, 965 (1990) (footnotes omitted).   
35
 See Martha Woodmansee, The Genius and the Copyright: Economic and Legal Conditions of the Emergence of 
the ‘Author’ 17 EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY STUD. 425 (1984) [hereinafter Woodmansee, Genius and the Copyright]; 
MARTHA WOODMANSEE, THE AUTHOR, ART AND THE MARKET: REREADING THE HISTORY OF AESTHETICS (1994); 
THE CONSTRUCTION OF AUTHORSHIP: TEXTUAL APPROPRIATION IN LAW AND LITERATURE  (Martha Woodmansee 
& Peter Jaszi eds., 1994); MARK ROSE, AUTHORS AND OWNERS: THE INVENTION OF COPYRIGHT (1993) [hereinafter 
ROSE, AUTHORS AND OWNERS]; Mark Rose, The Author as Proprietor: Donaldson v Becket and the Genealogy of 
Modern Authorship, 23 REPRESENTATIONS 51 (1988); Mark Rose, The Author in Court: Pope v Curl (1741), 21 
CULTURAL CRITIQUE 197 (1992); see also Molly Nesbitt, What Was an Author? 229 YALE FRENCH STUD. 73 
(1987); Carla Hesse, Enlightenment Epistemology and the Laws of Authorship in Revolutionary France, 1777-1793 
30 REPRESENTATIONS 109 (1990).   
36
 Woodmansee, On the Author, supra note 32 at 291. 
37
 Id. at 291. 
38
 JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE AND SPLEENS: LAW AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE INFORMATION 
SOCIETY 51-60 (1996); James D.A. Boyle The Search for an Author: Shakespeare and the Framers, 37 AM. U. L. 
REV. 625 (1988); see also, Peter Jaszi, Towards a Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphoses of “Authorship,” 1991 
DUKE L.J. 455.  
39
 ROSE, Authors and Owners, supra note 35 at 141. 
40
 Mark Rose, Mothers and Authors: Johnson v. Calvert and the New Children of Our Imaginations, 22 CRITICAL 
INQUIRY 613, 614 (1996) [hereinafter Rose, Mothers and Authors]. 
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imagination is integral to all Romantic theorists of art;
41
 it is also integral to copyright law and 
the line that it draws between the original authorship that is to be encouraged and rewarded, and 
the unlawful reproduction that is to be prohibited.  
 
 
III. The Gendered Author 
 
A. The Solitary Self 
 
Of course, the reader may say, nothing in this description of copyright’s underlying 
Romantic aesthetic has any particular relevance to issues of gender or diversity: after all, men 
have no monopoly on originality. But when it comes to philosophizing about the nature of 
“mankind” and the ostensibly objective values it entails, feminists have, across decades and 
disciplines, sought to show how neutral language and “objective” descriptions bear the marks of 
gender, and so construct hierarchies with gendered significance under the guise of “false 
universality.”42 The copyright field is no exception. Such feminist critiques are increasingly 
being brought to bear directly on the seemingly gender-neutral realm of copyright law to 
problematize, deconstruct, and potentially transform the way in which its core concepts, 
doctrines, and perceived purposes are understood and realized.
43
 
 
One starting point for a feminist critique of copyright’s Romantic aesthetics is to draw 
the connection between conceptions of authorship and conceptions of selfhood. The author-
figure—this product of the enlightenment era and Lockean notions of self-ownership—is 
essentially the familiar protagonist of liberal possessive individualism. As Shelley Wright 
explains:  
 
The existing definition of copyright . . . presupposes that individuals live in 
isolation from one another, that the individual is an autonomous unit who creates 
artistic works and sells them, or permits their sale by others, while ignoring the 
individual’s relationship with others within her community, family, ethnic group, 
                                                          
41
 CHRISTINE BATTERSBY, GENDER AND GENIUS: TOWARDS A FEMINIST AESTHETICS 145 (1994) [hereinafter 
BATTERSBY, GENDER AND GENIUS]. 
42
 Carolyn Korsmeyer, Feminist Aesthetics, THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (substantive revision 
Nov. 7, 2012) available at: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/feminism-aethetics (See definition of ‘Feminist 
Aesthetics’). 
43
 See, e.g., Andrea Abernethy Lunsford, Rhetoric, Feminism, and the Politics of Textual Ownership, 61 C. ENG. 
529 (1999); Deborah Halbert, Poaching and Plagiarizing: Property, Plagiarism, and Feminist Futures, in 
PERSPECTIVES ON PLAGIARISM AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN A POSTMODERN WORLD 111 (Lise Buranen & 
Alice M. Roy eds., 1999) [hereinafter Halbert, Poaching];  Malla Pollack, Toward a Feminist Theory of the Public 
Domain, or Rejecting the Gendered Scope of United States Copyrightable and Patentable Subject Matter, 12 WM. 
& MARY J. WOMEN & L. 603 (2006); Ann Bartow, Fair Use and the Fairer Sex: Gender, Feminism, and Copyright 
Law, 14 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 551 (2006); Dan L. Burk, Copyright and Feminism in Digital Media, 
14 AM. U. J. GENDER, SOC. POL'Y & L. 519 (2006); Dan L. Burk, Feminism and Dualism in Intellectual Property 
Law, 15 AM. U. J. GENDER, SOC. POL'Y & L. 183 (2007). 
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religion—the very social relations out of which and for the benefit of whom the 
individual’s limited monopoly rights are supposed to exist.44  
 
This is an important claim because it opens copyright law to an enormous body of critical 
discourse ranging from the political to the aesthetic, and from the communitarian to the 
postmodern. Most apt for our purposes here is the critical assertion common to much feminist 
political theorizing that this fictional liberal self, with its double-edged claim to individuality 
and universalizability, disguises difference, disregards social “situatedness,” and so subsumes 
and perpetuates a history of domination, subordination, and exclusion. I have argued elsewhere 
that this mythic individualized author is not only profoundly ideological and historically 
contingent, but also derives from a strongly gendered vision of the autonomous self:
45
 it truly 
belongs to what Foucault termed the “fundamental category of ‘the-man-and-his-work.’”46  
 
Feminist and other critical theorists challenge the notion of the subject that underpins 
this valorization of individuality: the atomized self who transcends society and subjectivity, 
labors alone, who acquires rights, owns property, calculates rationally, and transacts freely. The 
core objection is, of course, that “[t]he place of the free-willed subject who can transcend 
nature's mandates is reserved exclusively for men.”47 If the radically individualized self is the 
exclusive domain of men, then must not the same be said of the independent, original author at 
the center of copyright law?  
 
The Lockean individual who appropriates through labor by virtue of his solitary efforts, 
for example, is a foundational precept in Western property systems, and, I have suggested 
elsewhere, a persistent specter in our intellectual property discourse.
48
 As Carole Pateman has 
argued, however, for Locke, “women are excluded from the status of ‘individual’ in the natural 
condition.”49 The “masculinist underpinnings” of the Lockean premise of self-ownership are 
thus imported into copyright’s theoretical framework with every invocation of the author’s right 
to “reap what he has sown” and to enjoy the “fruits of his labor.”50 The well-rehearsed feminist 
critique of the liberal subject readily extends to the idea of the “homo economicus” or 
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“economic man”51 who dominates copyright’s increasingly utilitarian narratives. As feminist 
theorists have shown, the universal subject of the neo-classical economic model—the 
unencumbered subject who makes rational calculations on the basis of self-interest—similarly 
excludes considerations of human relations, situation, and power. Once revealed, the 
positionality of the homo economicus (who most closely resembles the privileged white, male, 
heterosexual elite) suggests that “economic rationales are often merely a way to preserve the 
patriarchal status quo.”52 Might the same be said when copyright is justified on the basis that 
authors, cast in the role economically rational actors, create in response to the incentives offered 
by copyright protection?
53
  
 
For the common law copyright system, whose justifications so depend on the vision of 
the industrious, deserving, and rational author, such a conclusion goes to the very heart of the 
system, how it works, and who it privileges. Deborah Halbert and other feminist copyright 
scholars, building on such theoretical critiques, have sought to show their practical ramifications 
by pointing to particular forms of gendered creative practice excluded from copyright’s domain 
by virtue of their misalignment with the solitary authorship trope. Thus, for example, the 
preparation of food and the fabrication of clothing, both traditionally women’s work relegated 
to the domestic realm, have existed largely outside of the intellectual property paradigm,
54
 as 
have the products of shared creative practices such as quilting and knitting.
55
 Collaborative and 
collective projects, whether based on relationships of care or born of functional necessity, have 
been marginalized or problematized by the model of individual, commodified intellectual 
production—usually with gendered implications.56   
 
 The distinction between fine art and crafts has been a particular focus of feminist 
critique. The very concept of art was narrowed to include works produced purely for their 
aesthetic virtues, and thus distinguished from arts produced for practical use, which came to be 
designated as “crafts.” Making craftworks, though skillful, was not regarded as possessing the 
same order of originality. Thus traditional domestic arts, predominantly the domain of women, 
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came to be excluded from the realm of art and the records of art history.
57
 Indeed, such was the 
gendered impact of this “formalist condemnation of the utilitarian” that it might reasonably be 
thought to “follow from rather that dictate the rejection of women’s art.”58 I have already 
suggested that the distinction between “artistic works” and utilitarian works of craftsmanship 
represents an important boundary in the legal limits of copyright protection governed by a 
hidden aesthetics. To the extent that the arts-craft boundary disproportionately excluded women 
from public recognition in the visual arts, copyright’s boundaries compounded this exclusion by 
withholding the benefits of legal protection.   
 
At a more abstract level, the very idea of the transcendent, independent author and the 
romantic aestheticism that he embodies has also been the target of feminist aesthetic theorists. 
An aesthetic theory that takes as its starting point the artist as unencumbered, universal 
individual, must fail to appreciate not only the nature of the creative process, but also the 
aesthetic value of the creative work. Estella Lauter explains: 
 
Art is not produced in a rarefied atmosphere that transcends gender 
identification. We create as men and women who are influenced by biological 
and imaginative mothers and fathers. Far from being a set of discrete, 
autonomous art objects, art is deeply contextual . . . [with] multiple relationships 
to its contexts.
59
  
 
Art, then, or the “work” in copyright terms, is not autonomous; it must be seen in context, as 
socially and culturally situated, and not as the free-standing, stable product of a transcendent 
author. So let us turn now to consider the ways in which these gendered assumptions about the 
individuality of the author have informed our aesthetic evaluations of the author’s work (and 
worth), and our conceptualization of the author-work relationship.  
 
 
B. The Gender of Genius 
 
In the nineteenth century, Marilyn Randall explains, the concept of individual authorship 
was compounded by the “great author” phenomenon: originality was the mark of an 
individual’s genius. A great author was a “great soul emitting inspired and universal truths,”60 
while lesser humans could merely follow suit by learning, imitating, and borrowing. While I 
have stressed the masculinist detachment of the originating author-genius, it is interesting to 
note that this romantic instantiation of “genius” is just one in an evolving progression of 
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competing conceptualizations of genius over time. Christine Battersby, describing the 
“gendering of genius” suggests that every iteration of the author-genius, from the pre-modern to 
the post-modern, has hailed whatever characteristics women were believed, at that time, to most 
lack (whether it be passion, reason, madness, or even, most recently, the willingness to discard 
the claim to subjective authority).
61
 Thus, genius has consistently been defined in 
contradistinction to the feminine. For example, in the Renaissance period, women were thought 
to be too creative and so not sufficiently capable of perceiving objective truth to qualify for the 
label of genius.
62
 For Jean-Jacques Rousseau, writing in the mid-18
th
 century, the basis for 
claiming that “women, in general, possess no artistic sensibility . . . nor genius” was that 
women’s writings are “as cold and pretty as women; . . . they are a hundred times more 
reasoned than impassioned.”63 Women’s failing, then, was a deficiency in passion. Immanuel 
Kant, for whom Rousseau was a great hero, wrote his own treatise on aesthetics and the 
sublime,
 64
 which also explicitly excluded women from ranks of genius, now on the basis that 
woman are passionate creatures whereas genius is a matter of reason.
65
 For Kant, women’s 
overriding duty was to be beautiful, to pursue feminine qualities of grace, charm, domesticity. 
The pursuit of knowledge or deep (as opposed to beautiful) understanding was therefore 
defeminizing. The woman who knows Greek or mechanics “might as well even have a beard,” 
he wrote, and the woman who succeeds in laborious learning “destroy[s] the merits that are 
proper to her sex.”66 Sublime pleasure, meanwhile, was “closed off to all except the ‘moral 
man.’”67  
 
Battersby emphasizes that creative women today face problems that derive directly from 
a Romantic inheritance—a Romantic aesthetics that built on Kantian epistemology and 
produced a conception of genius that is particularly harmful to women: 
 
Our present criteria for artistic excellence have their origins in theories that 
specifically and explicitly denied women genius. We still associate the great 
artist with certain (male) personality-types, certain (male) social roles, and 
certain kinds of (male) energies. . . . Women who want to create must still 
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manipulate aesthetic concepts taken from a mythology and biology that were 
profoundly anti-female.
68
 
 
To the extent, then, that copyright law has maintained and incubated this great artist figure in its 
rationale and rhetoric, this is a damning indictment of copyright indeed. It surely strikes at the 
core of our copyright structures to concede that “[t]he origins of intellectual property law, 
authorship, originality, and plagiarism are indebted to understanding creation as the domain of 
males who are the only ones authorized to speak and write.”69  
 
Throughout her fascinating book, Battersby advances that argument that genius itself is 
male,
70
 and constructs the powerful claim that the Romantic notion of genius has consistently 
been wielded “to try and beat back the female hordes invading the male space of European 
culture.”71 What makes this perhaps most indicative of a continually shifting and evolving 
cultural misogyny, she argues, is that Romanticism elevates precisely those attributes that were 
previously downgraded as “feminine” (emotionality, sensitivity, spontaneity, self-expression); 
but what is seen as natural imperfection in women is regarded as accomplished perfection in a 
man.  
 
For Battersby, the most egregious or ironic of these male misappropriations of feminine 
attributes as indicators of exclusively male genius, is the concept of author as mother—or, as 
she describes it, the metaphor of “male motherhood,” which became increasingly common over 
the 19
th
 century: “The artist conceived, was pregnant, labored (in sweat and pain), was 
delivered, and (in an uncontrolled ecstasy of agonized—male—control) brought forth. These 
were the images of ‘natural’ childbirth that the male creators elaborated.”72  This tendency 
reached its climax in the writings of Friedrich Nietzsche, for whom a genius was “one who 
either begets or gives birth spiritually,” while an average man who failed to create thus failed to 
become “a ‘mother’ type in the grand sense,” but rather resembled “an old maid.”73 For 
Nietzsche, however, a woman who “dabbled” in art lost “her instincts,”74 and her education 
“defeminized” her.75 These representations of genius and creativity thus commandeered, for 
male creators, inherently female attributes, while simultaneously constricting women’s creative 
capacities to the physical act of procreation. Battersby offers the words of Frank Barron, a 
lauded expert on the psychology of creativity, as a more recent textual example that underscores 
this ironic exclusion: 
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The creative act is a kind of giving birth, and it is noteworthy that as an historical 
fact intellectual creativity has been conspicuously lacking in women, whose 
products are their children. At the risk of making too much of a linguistic 
parallel, it might be said that nature has literally arranged a division of labour. 
Men bring forth ideas, paintings, literary and musical compositions . . . while 
women bring forth the new generation.
76
 
 
As Mark Rose reminds us in his insightful article on “Mothers and Authors,” the 
analogy of authorship to procreation invokes the gendered mind/body (male/female, 
intellect/matter) dichotomy, with the necessary implication that “authorship is a gendered 
category.”77 Rose notes that the author’s right, in copyright law, to have his name attached to a 
work he created is known as the “right to paternity.”78 Authorial attribution is the right to be 
identified and to so protect the patrilineal line, as it were. Indeed, copyright is replete with 
parental metaphors: the author “originates,” “creates,” and “labours”; he acquires rights of 
“reproduction”; he defends his propriety with claims of “independent creation”; when his 
identity is unknown, his work is described as “orphaned.” The filial relation represents the 
origin and legitimacy of the intellectual offspring, and the rightful claims of the author-parent. 
The presence of these metaphors within copyright’s most fundamental doctrines should alert us 
to the gendered nature of copyright. It should also provoke us to ask what work these concepts 
are doing in shaping the development of the law and its application.  
 
William Patry has also rued the “creation-as-birth” metaphor and, in particular, the way 
in which is wielded in the copyright domain to suggest that authors should enjoy extensive 
control over their works.
79
 In urging the passage of the Statute of Anne, Daniel Defoe declared: 
“A Book is the Author’s Property, ‘tis the Child of his Inventions, the Brat of his Brain; . . . ’tis 
as much his own, as his Wife and Children.”80 We see here the ideological link of the Romantic 
author-genius to the author-owner who features so prominently in modern copyright discourse: 
copyright’s protagonist is a surviving figure of “patriarchal domesticity; the author as master of 
his household.”81 The relationship conjured between the male author-mother and the text-child 
is not one of nurturing, maternal love, but paternal ownership combined with the power of 
market alienation. The oft-quoted words of Nathaniel Shaler exemplify this link between 
paternity and property: “The man who brings out of the nothingness some child of his thought, 
has rights therein which cannot belong to any other sort of property.”82 The common merging of 
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the (ostensibly incompatible) childbirth and property metaphors, still characteristic of much 
modern day copyright rhetoric, can be understood only when seen through the prism of 
patriarchy.   
 
From a feminist perspective, of course, the childbirth metaphor could be reimagined to 
yield alternative conclusions about the relationship of author to text. Rather than a bond based 
on single-sexed origination, patrilineal lineage, and enduring control, childbirth for the 
biological mother requires an inevitable letting go: the cutting of the umbilical cord, nurturing, 
raising and preparing the child to go out into the world, to speak on its own behalf, to interact 
and form relations with others, to have children of its own. Perhaps, then, the creation-as-
childbirth metaphor can be used critically to reimagine the relationship between author and text, 
and between texts in the ongoing process of cultural creation. Mark Rose makes a similar 
argument by emphasizing, rather than the relationship of mother and child, the modern 
understanding of human genetics:  
 
[T]he paternity metaphor obscures the fact that literary works are the products of 
complex collaborations in which many individuals are involved . . . , and that 
literary works are produced through acts of generation that involve the 
adaptation and transformation of materials from the literary gene pool rather than 
creation out of nothingness. . . . The paternity metaphor is patriarchal and 
obsolete. More significantly, the entire conception of authorship embedded in the 
paternity trope is obsolete. We need a better biology of authorship.
83
 
 
Either conceptual approach is an attempt to disrupt the “male motherhood” metaphor that 
shaped Romantic conceptions of genuine authorship, and pervaded legal discourse in the 
justification of authors’ rights. Both illustrate the way in which copyright law, freed from 
gendered notions of authorship and genius, might evolve to better reflect the processes of 
intellectual creativity and the dynamic nature of the text.   
 
 
IV. A Feminist Aesthetics for Copyright Law? 
 
I have suggested, in the preceding sections, that copyright law is not aesthetically 
neutral, despite common claims that it demands no aesthetic evaluation of the works to which it 
extends. I have argued that, in fact, copyright law is dominated by a Romantic aestheticism that 
venerates originality and denigrates derivative expression. I have also shown, I hope, that 
copyright’s dominant aesthetic theory, and the implicit assumptions about creators and their 
works that it generates, are not neutral or gender-free. In fact, the trope of romantic authorship 
and the related idea of “genius” are radically gendered—and the notion of the author-genius as 
rightful owner is fundamentally patriarchal. If copyright’s protagonist is revealed to be a 
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surviving figure of patriarchal mythology, and if the structures of copyright law were developed 
to reward and encourage his efforts, then perhaps the feminist must conclude that copyright law 
is simply “rotten to the core;” it cannot be redeemed but must be discarded.  
 
 At best, the feminist must concede that copyright law, in its modern form, was a law 
written by men, for men. Certainly, in copyright’s formative era, the powers that it granted 
vested in male authors. By refusing most women the legal status or benefits of proprietors, the 
law denied most female authors the proprietary relationship with their texts enjoyed by their 
male counterparts.
84
 The practical distance thus produced between women’s creative practices 
and the market may also have produced, in a sense, a psychological distance, a space of 
resistance, between the cultural creativity and its commoditization.
85
 Regarded in this way, it 
would not be surprising to find that women’s relationship to their texts acquired a different 
hue—one that is not accurately reflected in the proprietary structures of control maintained by 
the copyright system. Anne Bartow captures this idea powerfully when she states: “Copyright 
laws were written by men to embody a male vision of the ways in which creativity and 
commerce should intersect.”86  
 
And so, it remains to be asked, how might a feminist aesthetic be brought to bear in the 
copyright realm to challenge and change the way in which the law now regulates creative 
expression? To be clear, there is no unified definition or substance to the category of feminist 
aesthetics that could produce a single answer to such a question. Rather, it embraces a wide 
array of perspectives that seek, in various ways, to question seemingly gender neutral 
philosophical theories and assumptions about art and aesthetic categories, ideas about artists and 
aesthetic value, and the influences of power in the social formation of the situated subject.
87
 As 
this would suggest, the avenues of possible critique in the field of copyright law are manifold, 
and their potential implications are as diverse as the perspectives that inform them.  
 
So, for example, copyright’s subject matter categories could be critically examined on 
the basis of the works that they privilege as part of copyright’s “core,” and those that they 
marginalize or exclude. Consider, again, how copyright has tackled the categorization of 
“artistic works” when troubled by the utilitarian products lurking at the margins. As Yen 
demonstrated, it has done so by employing (while denying) the use of traditional aesthetic 
theories. An approach grounded in traditional “formal” aesthetics might ask whether the work 
generates an aesthetic response in people; feminist theorists might ask, “what people?”, and 
challenge the notion of art as autonomous from moral or political concerns. After all, aesthetic 
responses, tied up as they are with judgments of beauty, have tended to assign women the role 
of bearers of meaning under the male gaze, rather than makers of meaning. A feminist 
“reception theory” would instead seek to understand the art’s relationship to its cultures—the 
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political, social, religious, economic, and aesthetic responses that it generates—rather than to 
define it within categories.
88
 A traditional “intentionalist” approach would inquire into the 
purposes of the work’s creator; a feminist theorist might ask why the function of covering a bed, 
for example, is less worthy than the function of achieving professional accolades or making 
money.
89
 Whose purpose is privileged, and when can art transcend purpose? An “institutionlist” 
aesthetic theory might be brought to bear to examine whether a work is accorded the status of 
art in the artworld; a feminist aesthetics would reveal that “work by women that seems identical 
in value to work by men may not be [considered] art (or good art) when the artworld’s filters 
contain social biases about women along with precepts about art.”90 
 
In this way, it becomes evident, I think, that using feminist aesthetics to problematize 
the underlying assumptions at work in defining copyright’s categories could challenge some of 
copyright’s exclusionary ideals and practices, and precipitate a re-evaluation of many forms of 
expression that are relegated to copyright’s margins or excluded from its protective sphere as 
art’s Other. Similarly, the use of feminist aesthetic theories to unsettle ideas of independent 
creation could offer new ways of thinking about and assessing standards of “originality.” 
Whereas courts traditionally look for the absence of copying as the sine qua non of legal 
protection, a feminist approach that “returns art to its social contexts,”91 might reveal the ways 
in which even identical reproductions can resituate prior works, lending them “new” meanings 
across space and time. Deconstructing the Romantic division between origination and imitation 
could thus suggest alternative standards for measuring expressive worth and assessing the need 
for encouragement and protection. For example, feminist aesthetics, which also emphasizes the 
connections within and between communities of artists, might support a more relational 
approach to the originality determination—one that views the work, not in isolation, but in 
dialogic relation to the other works on which it is based or to which it responds.
92
 And, of 
course, by dismantling the myth of solitary authorship, feminist aesthetics would pave the way 
to a new appreciation and valorization of art produced cooperatively, collaboratively, or 
collectively (whether in concert or separated by space and time).
93
 Broadly speaking, in the 
copyright domain, as elsewhere, “with the help of feminist aesthetics we are able to appreciate 
old things in new ways and to assimilate new things that would be excluded by traditional 
aesthetic theory.”94      
 
The intent here, it should be stressed, is not to extend copyright to cover more forms of 
expression (and so to impose more expressive limits on others). Just as the critical enterprise of 
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feminist aesthetics does not stand or fall by proving some kind of parity with male literary or 
artistic “genius,” a feminist critique of copyright does not succeed or fail with its ability to 
extend the privileges of copyright protection to more women authors or predominantly female 
creative practices. Rather, by bringing feminist aesthetics into the heated debates around 
copyright law, we can critically re-evaluate the theoretical underpinnings of a copyright system 
based on gendered assumptions about creativity, economic reward, exclusion, and control.  
 
V. Conclusion 
 
Our copyright system is not aesthetically agnostic. Its willingness to protect the most 
mundane of works is not a basis on which to conclude that the law makes no aesthetic 
judgment. Nor is the fact that copyright attaches to “every original literary, dramatic, musical 
and artistic work” a reason to believe that the extraordinary protections it affords are neutral and 
unbiased. In fact, the reach—and the very rationale—of copyright are informed by the aesthetic 
theories that dominated at its inception and prevailed throughout its most formative years. 
Copyright’s commitment to independent origination, its conception of protectable subject 
matter, its insistence upon proprietary reward—all the most fundamental assumptions stitched 
into the complex quilt of copyright—are cut from the cloth of romantic aestheticism.  
 
For the copyright theorist, this suggests the need to critically reevaluate copyright’s 
norms and effects through an interdisciplinary lens. It demands that we draw on insights from 
the fields of aesthetics and the philosophy of art, literary and music theory, for example, to 
problematize and ultimately improve the law’s understanding of the creative self, expressive 
practices, and intellectual products. For the feminist theorist, however, the recognition of 
copyright’s dominant aesthetic theory also reveals its inherently gendered nature, suggesting the 
need to identify and disrupt the masculinist assumptions and patriarchal structures supported 
and preserved by the legal construct of copyright. It demands that we focus our interdisciplinary 
lens on the critical feminist insights and activities that have disrupted and deconstructed 
conventional knowledge and practice across disciplines. In particular, as I have argued here, a 
turn towards the field of feminist aesthetics could bring the promise of a quite radically 
reimagined copyright system. If we remain within the horizons of the Romantic myth, however, 
we will only be able to progress so far.
95
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